Letting AI Agents Use the AWS CLI Safely — A 2026 Defense-in-Depth Design That Disarms Any Single Credential

Hand an AI agent a shell and AWS credentials at the same time, and a single prompt injection can translate straight into deleted cloud resources or exfiltrated secrets. IAM Identity Center plus ReadOnlyAccess is the right starting direction. But ReadOnlyAccess is not 'read-only equals safe,' and tool-side deny rules do not survive adversarial evasion. Working from the premise that the only trustworthy enforcement boundaries are IAM and OS sandboxes, we layer defenses across authentication, authorization, execution, approval, and audit so that seizing a repository or a shell alone never reaches production.

Letting AI Agents Use the Google Cloud CLI Safely — Drop the Keys, Lock It Down with Impersonation and a Command Broker

Hand an AI agent a shell and Google Cloud credentials at the same time, and a single prompt injection can turn into a misfired gcloud command that escalates privileges or exfiltrates data. Short-lived credentials and least privilege, which is Google's official guidance, are the right direction. But service account keys persist dangerously when leaked, and tool-side deny rules do not survive adversarial evasion. Working from the premise that the only trustworthy enforcement boundaries are IAM, organization policy, and OS sandboxes, we layer defenses across authentication, authorization, execution, approval, and audit so that seizing a single input never reaches production.

Granting Google Cloud Access by Team — Access Groups and Folders as Two Axes

"Folders or group addresses?" is a false choice. Folders scope permissions, groups identify principals, and the right design uses both axes together.